| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP5220 |
| DP5220 From World Banker to World Venture Capitalist: US External Adjustment and The Exorbitant Privilege | |
| Helene Rey; Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas | |
| 发表日期 | 2005-09-23 |
| 出版年 | 2005 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Polities differ in the extent to which political parties can pre-commit to carry out promised policy actions if they take power. Commitment problems may arise due to a divergence between the ex ante incentives facing national parties that seek to capture control of the legislature and the ex post incentives facing individual legislators, whose interests may be more parochial. We study how differences in "party discipline" shape fiscal policy choices. In particular, we examine the determinants of national spending on local public goods in a three-stage game of campaign rhetoric, voting, and legislative decision-making. We find that the rhetoric and reality of pork-barrel spending, and also the efficiency of the spending regime, bear a non-monotonic relationship to the degree of party discipline. |
| 主题 | International Trade and Regional Economics |
| 关键词 | Political economy Electoral competition Public goods Party politics |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp5220 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/534093 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Helene Rey,Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas. DP5220 From World Banker to World Venture Capitalist: US External Adjustment and The Exorbitant Privilege. 2005. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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