G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP5227
DP5227 What's the monetary value of distributive justice?
Giacomo Corneo; Christina Fong
发表日期2005-09-23
出版年2005
语种英语
摘要This paper analyses takeovers of companies owned by atomistic shareholders and by one minority blockholder, all of whom can only decide to tender or retain their shares. As private benefit extraction is inefficient, the post-takeover share value increases with the bidder's shareholdings. In a successful takeover, the blockholder tenders all his shares and the small shareholders tender the amount needed such that the post-takeover share value matches the bid price. Compared to a fully dispersed target company, the bidder may have to offer a higher price either to win the blockholder's support or to attract enough shares from small shareholders.
主题Financial Economics
关键词Large shareholder Takeover premia
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp5227
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/534100
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Giacomo Corneo,Christina Fong. DP5227 What's the monetary value of distributive justice?. 2005.
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