| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP5228 |
| DP5228 Political competition within and between parties: an application to environmental policy | |
| Helmuth Cremer; Philippe De Donder; Firouz Gahvari | |
| 发表日期 | 2005-09-23 |
| 出版年 | 2005 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We find the Nash equilibria for monotone n-player symmetric games where each player chooses whether to participate. Examples include market entry games, coordination games, and the bar-room game depicted in the movie 'A Beautiful Mind'. The symmetric Nash equilibrium involves excessive participation (a common property resource problem) if participants? payoffs are decreasing (in the number of participants), and insufficient participation if payoffs are increasing. With decreasing payoffs there can be many equilibria, but with increasing payoffs there are only three. Some comparative static properties of changing one player?s participation payoffs are counter-intuitive, especially with more than two players. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Market entry Coordination Nash equilibrium Mixed strategy equilibrium Common property resource problem Comparative statics |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp5228 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/534101 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Helmuth Cremer,Philippe De Donder,Firouz Gahvari. DP5228 Political competition within and between parties: an application to environmental policy. 2005. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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