| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP5230 |
| DP5230 On-the-Job Search and Sorting | |
| Coen N. Teulings; Pieter A. Gautier; Aico van Vuuren | |
| 发表日期 | 2005-09-23 |
| 出版年 | 2005 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper studies price competition between experts and discounters in a market for credence goods. While experts can identify a consumer's problem by exerting costly but unobservable diagnosis effort, discounters just sell treatments without giving any advice. The unobservability of diagnosis effort induces experts to use their tariffs as signaling devices. This makes them vulnerable to competition by discounters. We explore the conditions under which experts survive competition by discounters and find that there exist situations in which adding a single customer to a large population of existing consumers leads to a switch from an experts only to a discounters only market. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Experts Discounters Credence goods Vertical restraints |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp5230 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/534102 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Coen N. Teulings,Pieter A. Gautier,Aico van Vuuren. DP5230 On-the-Job Search and Sorting. 2005. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
