| 来源类型 | Discussion paper
|
| 规范类型 | 论文
|
| 来源ID | DP5234
|
| DP5234 A Global Perspective on External Positions |
| Philip Lane
|
| 发表日期 | 2005-09-23
|
| 出版年 | 2005
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | We model the interaction between two economies where banks exhibit both adverse selection and moral hazard and bank regulators try to resolve these problems. We find that liberalizing bank capital flows between economies reduces total welfare by reducing the average size and efficiency of the banking sector. This effect can be countered by a adopting a 'level playing field' forcing international harmonization of capital requirements and deposit rates across economies. Such a policy is good for weaker regulators whereas a laissez-faire policy under which each country chooses its own capital requirement is better for the higher quality regulator. We find that imposing a level playing field among countries is globally optimal provided regulators? abilities are not too different, and comment on how shocks will be transmitted differently across the two policy regimes. We extend the model to allow for multinational banks, licensed by both regulators, showing that the same considerations arise in this context. Allowing multinationals improves welfare when bank capital can flow across borders, despite the negative impact on local banks. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics
|
| 关键词 | Bank regulation
Capital
Multinational banks
International financial regulation
Level playing field
|
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp5234
|
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
|
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/534106
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Philip Lane. DP5234 A Global Perspective on External Positions. 2005.
|
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