| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP5235 |
| DP5235 Cities and Countries | |
| Andrew Rose | |
| 发表日期 | 2005-09-23 |
| 出版年 | 2005 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In 1988 the UK government introduced greater accountability into the English state school sector. But the information that schools are required to make public on their pupil achievement is only partial. The paper examines whether accountability measures based on a partial summary of student achievement influence the distribution of student achievement. Since school ratings only incorporate test results via pass rates, schools have incentives to improve the performance of students who are on the margin of meeting these standards, to the detriment of very low achieving or high achieving pupils. Using pupil level data for a cohort of all students in secondary public sector schools in England, we find that this policy reduces the educational gains and exam performance in high stakes exams of very low ability students. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | School accountability High stakes exams Educational value added |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp5235 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/534107 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Andrew Rose. DP5235 Cities and Countries. 2005. |
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