| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP5241 |
| DP5241 Participation Games: Market Entry, Coordination and the Beautiful Blonde | |
| Simon Anderson; Maxim Engers | |
| 发表日期 | 2005-09-23 |
| 出版年 | 2005 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper uses the Italian Social Security employer-employee panel to study the effects of the Italian reform of 1990 on worker and job flows. We exploit the fact that this reform increased unjust dismissal costs for firms below 15 employees, while leaving dismissal costs unchanged for bigger firms, to set up a natural experiment research design. We find that the increase in dismissal costs decreased accessions and separations for workers in small relative to big firms, especially in sectors with higher employment volatility. Moreover, we find that the reform reduced firms' employment adjustments on the internal margin as well as entry rates while increasing exit rates. |
| 主题 | Labour Economics |
| 关键词 | Unjust dismissal costs European unemployment Firms' entry and exit Employment volatility |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp5241 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/534113 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Simon Anderson,Maxim Engers. DP5241 Participation Games: Market Entry, Coordination and the Beautiful Blonde. 2005. |
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