| 来源类型 | Discussion paper
|
| 规范类型 | 论文
|
| 来源ID | DP5263
|
| DP5263 Trade and the Skill-Bias - It's Not How Much, But With Whom You Trade |
| Daniel Traça; Pushan Dutt
|
| 发表日期 | 2005-10-23
|
| 出版年 | 2005
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | A buyer seeks to procure a good characterized by its price and its quality from suppliers who have private information about their cost structure (fixed cost + marginal cost of providing quality). We solve for the optimal buying mechanism, i.e. the procedure that maximizes the buyer?s expected utility, and discuss its properties. Many of the properties of the optimal buying mechanism when information is one-dimensional (Laffont and Tirole, 1987; Che, 1993) no longer hold when we introduce private information about the fixed costs. We compare the performance of the optimal scheme to that of buying procedures used in practice, namely a quasilinear scoring auction and negotiation. Specifically, we characterize an upper bound to what a quasilinear scoring auction and negotiation can achieve, and compare the performance of these procedures numerically. Quasilinear scoring auctions are able to extract a good proportion of the surplus from being strategic. Negotiation does less well. In fact, our results suggest that negotiation does worse than holding a simple scoring auction where the buyer reveals his preference. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization
|
| 关键词 | Optimal auction
Multi-attribute auction
Differentiated product
Multidimensional screening
Scoring auction
Negotiation
Bargaining
Procurement
|
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp5263
|
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/534143
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Daniel Traça,Pushan Dutt. DP5263 Trade and the Skill-Bias - It's Not How Much, But With Whom You Trade. 2005.
|
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