| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP5273 |
| DP5273 Income and Democracy | |
| Daron Acemoğlu; Simon Johnson; James Robinson; Pierre Yared | |
| 发表日期 | 2005-10-23 |
| 出版年 | 2005 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We analyse the optimal delegation of decision rights by a uninformed principal to an informed but biased agent. When the principal cannot use message-contingent transfers, she offers the agent a set of decisions from which he can choose his preferred one. We fully characterize the optimal delegation set for general distributions of the state space and preferences with arbitrary continuous state-dependent biases. We also provide necessary and sufficient conditions for particular delegation sets to be optimal. Finally, we show that the optimal delegation set takes the form of a single interval if the agent's preferences are sufficiently similar to the principal's. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Delegation Decision rights Mechanism design |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp5273 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/534152 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Daron Acemoğlu,Simon Johnson,James Robinson,et al. DP5273 Income and Democracy. 2005. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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