| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP5276 |
| DP5276 Optimal Procurement When Both Price and Quality Matter | |
| Estelle Cantillon; John Asker | |
| 发表日期 | 2005-10-23 |
| 出版年 | 2005 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Recent work in the field of mechanism design has led some researchers to propose institutional changes that would permit parties to enter into non-modifiable contracts, which is not possible under current contract law. This paper demonstrates that it may well be socially desirable not to enforce contractual terms that explicitly prevent renegotiation, even if rational and symmetrically informed parties have deliberately signed such a contract. The impossibility to prevent renegotiation can constrain the principal's abilities to introduce distortions in order to reduce the agent's rent, so that the first-best benchmark solution will more often be attained. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Contract modification Renegotiation Moral hazard |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp5276 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/534155 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Estelle Cantillon,John Asker. DP5276 Optimal Procurement When Both Price and Quality Matter. 2005. |
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