| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP5277 |
| DP5277 The EU Deposit Insurance Directive: Does One Size Fit All? | |
| Harry Huizinga | |
| 发表日期 | 2005-10-23 |
| 出版年 | 2005 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We revisit the question of the efficiency of individual decisions to be protected against crime for the cases of both observable and unobservable protection. We obtain that observable protection is unambiguously associated with a negative externality and that at the individual level, it has a deterrence effect but no payoff reduction effect. Unobservable protection has a global deterrence effect and is associated with a private payoff reduction effect but no private deterrence effect. A decrease in the global crime payoff is detrimental to a victim if protection is observable, while it is beneficial with unobservable protection. While protection has a positive diversion effect when observable, it has the equivalent of a negative diversion effect when unobservable. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Crime Private protection Efficiency |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp5277 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/534156 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Harry Huizinga. DP5277 The EU Deposit Insurance Directive: Does One Size Fit All?. 2005. |
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