G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP5277
DP5277 The EU Deposit Insurance Directive: Does One Size Fit All?
Harry Huizinga
发表日期2005-10-23
出版年2005
语种英语
摘要We revisit the question of the efficiency of individual decisions to be protected against crime for the cases of both observable and unobservable protection. We obtain that observable protection is unambiguously associated with a negative externality and that at the individual level, it has a deterrence effect but no payoff reduction effect. Unobservable protection has a global deterrence effect and is associated with a private payoff reduction effect but no private deterrence effect. A decrease in the global crime payoff is detrimental to a victim if protection is observable, while it is beneficial with unobservable protection. While protection has a positive diversion effect when observable, it has the equivalent of a negative diversion effect when unobservable.
主题Public Economics
关键词Crime Private protection Efficiency
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp5277
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/534156
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Harry Huizinga. DP5277 The EU Deposit Insurance Directive: Does One Size Fit All?. 2005.
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