| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP5303 |
| DP5303 Identifying the Effects of Firing Restrictions Through Size-Contingent Differences in Regulation | |
| Fabiano Schivardi; Roberto Torrini | |
| 发表日期 | 2005-10-23 |
| 出版年 | 2005 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We use a unique dataset on individual retirement decisions in Swiss pension funds to analyze the choice between an annuity and a lump sum at retirement. Our analysis suggests the existence of an 'acquiescence bias', meaning that a majority of retirees chooses the standard option offered by the pensions fund or suggested by common practice. Small levels of accumulated pension capital are much more likely to be withdrawn as a lump sum, suggesting a potential moral hazard behaviour or a magnitude effect. We hardly find evidence for adverse selection effects in the data. Single men, for example, whose money?s worth of an annuity is considerably below the corresponding value of married men, are not more likely to choose the capital option. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Occupational pension Lump sum Annuity Choice anomalies |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp5303 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/534175 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Fabiano Schivardi,Roberto Torrini. DP5303 Identifying the Effects of Firing Restrictions Through Size-Contingent Differences in Regulation. 2005. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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