| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP5308 |
| DP5308 Black Sheep and Walls of Silence | |
| Gerd Muehlheusser; Andreas Roider | |
| 发表日期 | 2005-10-23 |
| 出版年 | 2005 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In our model, information-producing agents can opt to produce from the sell-side, in which case they can only sell their information to other market participants, or produce from the buy-side, in which case they agent can trade in the financial market. If sell-side information substitutes for that produced on the buy-side, some form of subsidy is necessary to sustain sell-side production in equilibrium because sell-side agents cannot commit to narrow dissemination of their information among buy-side agents. Competition among buy-side agents leaves buy-side (private) information as the primary source of trading profits. Subsidizing sell-side research promotes welfare because such information enters financial market prices and thereby improves real investment decisions. But subsidies compromise welfare through conflicts of interest facing the sell-side analyst. We derive conditions under which the net welfare effect is positive and shed light on means of managing the tradeoff. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Financial analysts Industrial organization Investment banking Conflicts of interest Securities regulation |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp5308 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/534180 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Gerd Muehlheusser,Andreas Roider. DP5308 Black Sheep and Walls of Silence. 2005. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
