| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP5312 |
| DP5312 Measuring Fiscal Sustainability | |
| Michael R. Wickens; Vito Polito | |
| 发表日期 | 2005-10-23 |
| 出版年 | 2005 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We develop a model where trade agreements - in addition to correcting terms-of-trade externalities - help governments to commit vis-a-vis domestic industrial lobbies. We explore how trade liberalization is affected by the characteristics of the political environment, such as the degree to which governments are politically motivated and the influence of lobbies during the negotiation of the agreement. We find that governments may prefer to commit to tariff ceilings, rather than exact tariff levels. We also find that trade liberalization is deeper when capital is more mobile across sectors. In a dynamic extension of the model, the optimal agreement entails an immediate slashing of tariffs followed by a phase of gradual trade liberalization. In the gradual phase, the speed of liberalization is higher when capital is more mobile. |
| 主题 | International Trade and Regional Economics |
| 关键词 | Trade agreements Lobbying Domestic commitment |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp5312 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/534184 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Michael R. Wickens,Vito Polito. DP5312 Measuring Fiscal Sustainability. 2005. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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