| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP5380 |
| DP5380 Separating Selection and Incentive Effects in Health Insurance | |
| Pierre-Yves Geoffard; Lucien Gardiol; Chantal Grandchamp | |
| 发表日期 | 2005-11-22 |
| 出版年 | 2005 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | The paper mainly addresses three questions: 1) do workers tend to be employed by employers of the same ethnic group; 2) what is the structure of the equilibrium wage contract; and 3) do more ethnically homogeneous labour markets tend to have different labour contracts than more ethnically diversified ones. The answer to the first question is in the affirmative - in equilibrium all employers offer the same wage contract and workers are hired by employers of the closest ethnic affiliation. In terms of the equilibrium wage contract, its nature depends on the attitude towards risk of both sides of the market. Finally, the answer to the third question is also in the affirmative since the more homogenous the labour market, the more deterministic is the wage. |
| 主题 | Labour Economics |
| 关键词 | Ethnicity Sharecropping Piece rates |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp5380 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/534230 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Pierre-Yves Geoffard,Lucien Gardiol,Chantal Grandchamp. DP5380 Separating Selection and Incentive Effects in Health Insurance. 2005. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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