| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP5376 |
| DP5376 Towards a Theory of Firm Entry and Stabilization Policy | |
| Giancarlo Corsetti; Paul R Bergin | |
| 发表日期 | 2005-11-28 |
| 出版年 | 2005 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | What are the equilibrium features of a dynamic financial market where traders care about their reputation for ability? We modify a standard sequential trading model to study a financial market with career concerns. We show that this market cannot be informationally efficient: there is no equilibrium in which prices converge to the true value, even after an infinite sequence of trades. This finding, which stands in sharp contrast with the results for standard financial markets, is due to the fact that our traders face an endogenous incentive to behave in a conformist manner. We show that there exist equilibria where career-concerned agents trade in a conformist manner when prices have risen or fallen sharply. We also show that each asset carries an endogenous reputational benefit or cost, which may lead to systematic mispricing if asset supply is not infinitely elastic. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Financial equilibrium Career concerns Information cascades Mispricing |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp5376 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/534238 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Giancarlo Corsetti,Paul R Bergin. DP5376 Towards a Theory of Firm Entry and Stabilization Policy. 2005. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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