| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP5386 |
| DP5386 Hypermarket Competition and the Diffusion of Retail Checkout Barcode Scanning | |
| Christian Wey; Jonathan Beck; Michal Grajek | |
| 发表日期 | 2005-11-30 |
| 出版年 | 2005 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper provides an analysis of the health insurance and health care consumption. A structural microeconomic model of joint demand for health insurance and health care is developed and estimated using full maximum likelihood method using Swiss insurance claims data for over 60,000 adult individuals. The estimation strategy relies on the institutional features of the Swiss system, in which each individual chooses among the same menu of contracts, ranked by the size of their deductible. The empirical analysis shows strong and robust evidence of selection effects. Nevertheless, once selection effects are controlled for, an important incentive effect ('ex-post moral hazard') remains. A decrease in the co-payment rate from 100% to 10% increases the marginal demand for health care by about 90% and from 100% to 0% by about 150%. The correlation between insurance coverage and health care expenditures may be decomposed into the two effects: 75% may be attributed to selection, and 25 % to incentive effects. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Health insurance Demand for health care Moral hazard Adverse selection Full maximum likelihood estimation |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp5386 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/534241 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Christian Wey,Jonathan Beck,Michal Grajek. DP5386 Hypermarket Competition and the Diffusion of Retail Checkout Barcode Scanning. 2005. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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