| 来源类型 | Discussion paper
|
| 规范类型 | 论文
|
| 来源ID | DP5388
|
| DP5388 Policy Volatility, Institutions and Economic Growth |
| Antonio Fatas; Ilian Mihov
|
| 发表日期 | 2005-11-30
|
| 出版年 | 2005
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | We develop a model of logit demand that extends to a multi-firm industry the traditional duopoly framework of network competition with access charges. Firstly, we show that, when incumbents do not face the threat of entry and compete in prices, they inefficiently establish the reciprocal access charge below cost. This inefficiency disappears if incumbents compete in utilities instead of prices. Secondly, we study how incumbents change their choices under the threat of entry when they determine an industry-wide (non-discriminatory) access charge. We show how incumbents may accommodate all possible entrants, only a group of them, or may completely deter entry. When entry deterrence is the preferred option, incumbents distort upwards the access charges. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization
|
| 关键词 | Telecommunications
Interconnection
Entry deterrence
|
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp5388
|
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
|
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/534242
|
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Antonio Fatas,Ilian Mihov. DP5388 Policy Volatility, Institutions and Economic Growth. 2005.
|
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