| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP5391 |
| DP5391 Externalities, Communication and the Allocation of Decision Rights | |
| Helmut Bester | |
| 发表日期 | 2005-11-30 |
| 出版年 | 2005 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We challenge the view that the presence of powerful buyers stifles suppliers' incentives to innovate. Following Katz (1987), we model buyer power as buyers' ability to substitute away from a given supplier and isolate several effects that support the opposite view, namely that the presence of powerful buyers induces a supplier to invest more in cost reduction. In contrast to negotiations with smaller buyers, the outcome of negotiations with large buyers is fully determined by their more valuable alternative supply option. This increases the supplier's incentives to reduce marginal costs, both as the supplier receives a larger fraction of the thereby generated incremental profits and as this makes buyers' alternative supply option less valuable. The latter effect is due to downstream competition between buyers and, as we show, is also stronger the larger and thus the more powerful buyers are. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Buyer power Merger Investment incentives |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp5391 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/534245 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Helmut Bester. DP5391 Externalities, Communication and the Allocation of Decision Rights. 2005. |
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