| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP5371 |
| DP5371 Do Entrenched Managers Pay Their Workers More? | |
| Jonas Vlachos; Mattias Nilsson; Helena Svaleryd; Henrik Cronqvist; Fredrik Heyman | |
| 发表日期 | 2005-12-05 |
| 出版年 | 2005 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Oligopoly is empirically prevalent in the industries where MNEs operate and national governments compete with fiscal inducements for their FDI projects. Despite this, existing formal treatments of fiscal competition generally focus on the polar cases of perfect competition and monopoly. We consider the competition between two potential host governments to attract the investment of both firms in a duopolistic industry. Competition by identical countries for a monopoly firm's investment is known to result in a 'race to the bottom' where all rents are captured by the firm through subsidies. We demonstrate that with two firms, both are taxed in equilibrium, despite the explicit non-cooperation between governments. When countries differ in size, a single firm will be attracted to the larger market. We explore the conditions under which both firms in the duopoly co-locate and when each nation attracts a firm in equilibrium. Our results are consistent with the observed stability of effective corporate tax rates in the face of ongoing globalization, and our analysis readily generalizes to many specifications with oligopoly in the product markets. |
| 主题 | International Trade and Regional Economics |
| 关键词 | Tax competition Foreign direct investment Oligopoly Market size asymmetries |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp5371 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/534248 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Jonas Vlachos,Mattias Nilsson,Helena Svaleryd,et al. DP5371 Do Entrenched Managers Pay Their Workers More?. 2005. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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