| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP5392 |
| DP5392 How Costly is it for Poor Farmers to Lift Themselves out of Subsistence? | |
| Olivier Cadot; Marcelo Olarreaga; Laure Dutoit | |
| 发表日期 | 2005-12-06 |
| 出版年 | 2005 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper presents a political economy model where there is mutual feedback between investor protection and stock market development. Better investor protection induces companies to issue more equity and thereby leads to a broader stock market. In turn, equity issuance expands the shareholder base and increases support for shareholder protection. This feedback loop can generate multiple equilibria, with investor protection and stock market size being positively correlated across equilibria. The model's predictions are tested on panel data for 47 countries over 1993-2002, controlling for country and year effects and endogeneity issues. We also document international convergence in shareholder protection to best-practice standards, and show that it is correlated with cross-border M&A activity, consistent with the model. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Political economy Shareholder protection Corporate governance Stock market development |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp5392 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/534251 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Olivier Cadot,Marcelo Olarreaga,Laure Dutoit. DP5392 How Costly is it for Poor Farmers to Lift Themselves out of Subsistence?. 2005. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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