| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP5402 |
| DP5402 The Todaro Paradox Revisited | |
| Yves Zenou | |
| 发表日期 | 2005-12-12 |
| 出版年 | 2005 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper views authority as the right to undertake decisions that impose externalities on other members of the organization. When only decision rights can be contractually assigned to one of the organization's stakeholders, the optimal assignment minimizes the resulting inefficiencies by giving control rights to the party with the highest stake in the organization's decisions. Under asymmetric information, the efficient allocation of authority depends on the communication of private information. In the case of multiple decision areas, divided control rights may enhance organizational efficiency unless there exist complementarities between different decisions. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Authority Decision rights Externalities Incomplete contracts Imperfect information Theory of the firm |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp5402 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/534261 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Yves Zenou. DP5402 The Todaro Paradox Revisited. 2005. |
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