| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP5370 |
| DP5370 Stock Markets and Business Cycle Comovement in Germany Before World War I: Evidence from Spectral Analysis | |
| Albrecht Ritschl; Martin Uebele | |
| 发表日期 | 2005-12-16 |
| 出版年 | 2005 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Analyzing a large panel that matches public firms with worker-level data, we find that managerial entrenchment affects workers? pay. CEOs with more control pay their workers more, but financial incentives through ownership of cash flow rights mitigate such behaviour. These findings do not seem to be driven by productivity differences, and are not affected by a series of robustness tests. Moreover, we find that entrenched CEOs pay more to (i) workers associated with aggressive unions; (ii) workers closer to the CEO in the corporate hierarchy, such as CFOs, division vice-presidents and other top-executives; and (iii) workers geographically closer to the corporate headquarters. This evidence is consistent with entrenched CEOs paying higher wages to enjoy non-pecuniary private benefits such as lower effort wage bargaining and improved social relations with certain workers. More generally, our results show that managerial ownership and corporate governance can play an important role for labour market outcomes. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Corporate governance Agency problems Private benefits Matched employer-employee data Wages |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp5370 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/534262 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Albrecht Ritschl,Martin Uebele. DP5370 Stock Markets and Business Cycle Comovement in Germany Before World War I: Evidence from Spectral Analysis. 2005. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
