| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP5417 |
| DP5417 Information Gathering, Transaction Costs and the Property Rights Approach | |
| Patrick W. Schmitz | |
| 发表日期 | 2005-12-16 |
| 出版年 | 2005 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper examines the impact of policy-makers' horizons on the sustainability of international cooperation. We describe a prisoners' dilemma game between two infinitely-lived organizations (countries) run by agents (policy-makers) with a shorter tenure. The agents' mandates are finite but potentially renewable and staggered across different organizations. We show that the efficient cooperative equilibrium is only sustainable when policy-makers are re-electable. Moreover, re-election incentives can act as a discipline device, making it easier to sustain cooperation between policy-makers with renewable mandates than between policy-makers who are automatically re-elected. However, if the chances of re-election depend significantly on recent performance, policy-makers will collude to get re-elected. In this case, term limits may help to sustain international cooperation. |
| 主题 | International Trade and Regional Economics |
| 关键词 | Self-enforcing cooperation Re-election incentives Overlapping generations |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp5417 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/534273 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Patrick W. Schmitz. DP5417 Information Gathering, Transaction Costs and the Property Rights Approach. 2005. |
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