| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP5357 |
| DP5357 Gun Prevalence, Homicide Rates and Causality: A GMM Approach to Endogeneity Bias | |
| Mark Schaffer; Gary Kleck; Tomislav Kovandzic | |
| 发表日期 | 2005-12-22 |
| 出版年 | 2005 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | The property rights approach to the theory of the firm suggests that ownership structures are chosen in order to provide ex ante investment incentives, while bargaining is ex post efficient. In contrast, transaction cost economics emphasizes ex post inefficiencies. In the present paper, a party may invest and acquire private information about the default payoff that it can realize on its own. Inefficient rent-seeking can overturn prominent implications of the property rights theory. In particular, ownership by party B may be optimal, even though only the indispensable party A makes an investment decision. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Theory of the firm Incomplete contracts Ownership rights |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp5357 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/534278 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Mark Schaffer,Gary Kleck,Tomislav Kovandzic. DP5357 Gun Prevalence, Homicide Rates and Causality: A GMM Approach to Endogeneity Bias. 2005. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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