| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP5436 |
| DP5436 How Licensing Resolves Hold-Up: Evidence from a Dynamic Panel Data Model with Unobserved Heterogeneity | |
| Ralph Siebert; Georg von Graevenitz | |
| 发表日期 | 2006-01-12 |
| 出版年 | 2006 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Standard & Poor's provides corporate governance ratings to firms who can, upon learning those, decide to reveal them or not to the market. This paper identifies the circumstances under which such a simple ownership contract over ratings can emerge as the optimal arrangement. Firms hiding their ratings can only be an equilibrium outcome if they are sufficiently uncertain of their quality at the time of hiring a certification intermediary and if the decision to get a rating is not observable. For some distribution functions of firms' qualities, a competitive market is a necessary condition for this result to obtain. Competition between rating intermediaries will unambiguously lead to less information being revealed in equilibrium. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Certification Corporate governance |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp5436 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/534300 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Ralph Siebert,Georg von Graevenitz. DP5436 How Licensing Resolves Hold-Up: Evidence from a Dynamic Panel Data Model with Unobserved Heterogeneity. 2006. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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