| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP5437 |
| DP5437 Mixing Media with Two-Part Tariffs | |
| Tommaso Valletti; Steffen Hoernig | |
| 发表日期 | 2006-01-12 |
| 出版年 | 2006 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We propose to view action-contingent contracts as bets, motivated by different prior beliefs between the contracting parties (rather than, say, as an instrument for overcoming moral hazard problems). Such differences in prior beliefs may arise from inherent biases such as over-optimism. Menus of contingent contracts that arise in principal-agent relationships are thus interpreted as a consequence of the principal's attempt to screen the agent's prior belief. Thus, an employer may offer his worker to choose between fixed-wage and profit-sharing schemes, in order to screen the worker's degree of optimism. We present a model of bilateral contracting which captures these ideas, characterize the optimal menu and apply it to a number of economic settings. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Speculative trade Non-common priors Menus |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp5437 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/534301 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Tommaso Valletti,Steffen Hoernig. DP5437 Mixing Media with Two-Part Tariffs. 2006. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
