| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP5443 |
| DP5443 A Dual Policy Paradox: Why Have Trade and Immigration Policies Always Differed in Labour-Scarce Economies? | |
| Timothy Hatton; Jeffrey G. Williamson | |
| 发表日期 | 2006-01-12 |
| 出版年 | 2006 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | When agents hold non-common priors over an unverifiable state of nature which affects the outcome of their future actions, they have an incentive to bet on the outcome. We pose the following question: what are the limits on the agents' ability to realize gains from speculative bets when their prior belief is private information? We apply a 'mechanism design' approach to this question, in the context of a pair of models: a principal-agent model in which the two parties bet on the agent's future action, and a market model in which traders bet on the future price. We characterize interim-efficient bets in these environments, and their implementability as a function of fundamentals. In general, implementability of interim-efficient bets diminishes as the costs of manipulating the bet's outcome become more uneven across states or agents. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Speculative trade Non-common priors Mechanism design Partnership dissolution |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp5443 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/534302 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Timothy Hatton,Jeffrey G. Williamson. DP5443 A Dual Policy Paradox: Why Have Trade and Immigration Policies Always Differed in Labour-Scarce Economies?. 2006. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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