| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP5451 |
| DP5451 Global Risk, Investment and Emotions | |
| Frans A.A.M. van Winden; R.A.J Bosman | |
| 发表日期 | 2006-01-13 |
| 出版年 | 2006 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study the consequences of leniency - reduced legal sanctions for wrongdoers who spontaneously self-report to law enforcers - on sequential, bilateral, illegal transactions such as corruption, manager-auditor collusion, or drug deals. It is known that leniency helps to deter illegal relationships sustained by repeated interaction. Here we find that - when not properly designed - leniency may simultaneously provide an effective governance mechanism for occasional sequential illegal transactions that would not be feasible in its absence. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Industrial Organization ; Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Amnesty Corruption Collusion Financial fraud Governance Hold up Hostages Illegal trade Immunity Law enforcement |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp5451 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/534306 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Frans A.A.M. van Winden,R.A.J Bosman. DP5451 Global Risk, Investment and Emotions. 2006. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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