| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP5458 |
| DP5458 The Swing Voter's Curse in the Laboratory | |
| Marco Battaglini; Thomas R Palfrey; Rebecca Morton | |
| 发表日期 | 2006-01-16 |
| 出版年 | 2006 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper is a study of licensing in a patent thicket. In a patent thicket licensing allows firms to avoid hold-up. It will have different effects on firms' R&D incentives depending on whether firms license existing or future patents. Building on a model of a patent portfolio race, firms' choice between these types of licensing contracts is modelled. We find that firms' relationships in product markets and technology space jointly determine the type of licensing contract chosen. We derive several hypotheses and test these. Using data from the semiconductor industry a dynamic panel data model with unobserved heterogeneity and a lagged dependent variable is estimated. A new method suggested by Wooldridge (2005) is employed to estimate a random effects probit model using conditional ML. The hypotheses derived from the theory are confirmed. Based on our results we argue that licensing raises welfare in the patent thicket. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Hold-up problem Licensing Innovation Patent race Patent thicket |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp5458 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/534310 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Marco Battaglini,Thomas R Palfrey,Rebecca Morton. DP5458 The Swing Voter's Curse in the Laboratory. 2006. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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