| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP5456 |
| DP5456 Minimum Wages and Firm Profitability | |
| Stephen Machin; John Van Reenen; Mirko Draca | |
| 发表日期 | 2006-01-18 |
| 出版年 | 2006 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We present a simple model of household (or consumer) lending in which, building on past information and local expertise, an incumbent lender has an information advantage both vis-a-vis potential competitors and households. We show that if the adverse selection problem faced by other lenders is sufficiently severe, the incumbent preserves his monopoly power and may engage in too aggressive lending. The incumbent lender may then approve credit even against a household?s best interest. In contrast, with effective competition it may now be less informed lenders who lend too aggressively to households who were rejected by the incumbent, though this only occurs if households 'naively' ignore the information contained in their previous rejection. We find that competition may also distort lending as less informed lenders try to free ride on the incumbent?s superior screening ability. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Consumer and personal finance Irresponsible lending practices Predatory lending |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp5456 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/534314 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Stephen Machin,John Van Reenen,Mirko Draca. DP5456 Minimum Wages and Firm Profitability. 2006. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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