| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP5465 |
| DP5465 Optimal Fines in the Era of Whistleblowers | |
| Giancarlo Spagnolo; Paolo Buccirossi | |
| 发表日期 | 2006-01-20 |
| 出版年 | 2006 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper reports the first laboratory study of the swing voter?s curse and provides insights on the larger theoretical and empirical literature on 'pivotal voter' models. Our experiment controls for different information levels of voters, as well as the size of the electorate, the distribution of preferences, and other theoretically relevant parameters. The design varies the share of partisan voters and the prior belief about a payoff relevant state of the world. Our results support the equilibrium predictions of the Feddersen-Pesendorfer model, and clearly reject the notion that voters in the laboratory use naïve decision-theoretic strategies. The voters act as if they are aware of the swing voter?s curse and adjust their behaviour to compensate. While the compensation is not complete and there is some heterogeneity in individual behaviour, we find that aggregate outcomes, such as efficiency, turnout, and margin of victory, closely track the theoretical predictions. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Swing voter's curse Voting behaviour Information aggregation |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp5465 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/534320 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Giancarlo Spagnolo,Paolo Buccirossi. DP5465 Optimal Fines in the Era of Whistleblowers. 2006. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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