| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP5448 |
| DP5448 Strong and Weak Ties in Employment and Crime | |
| Thierry Verdier; Yves Zenou; Antoni Calvó-Armengol | |
| 发表日期 | 2006-01-23 |
| 出版年 | 2006 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | The paper incorporates three institutional design features into a Kydland-Prescott, Barro-Gordon monetary policy game. It shows that goal-independence and goal-transparency (an explicit inflation target) at the central bank are substitute ?commitment technologies? that reduce inflation and build credibility. In addition, goal-transparency is shown to be socially superior as it also lowers public?s monitoring cost. Nevertheless, independent central bankers are less likely to embrace it if they perceive public scrutiny (accountability) as intrusive. Combining these findings implies that both goal-transparency and accountability will be negatively related to goal-independence for which we present empirical support using established indices. Our analysis further suggests that, to avoid an inferior equilibrium with opaque objectives and a ?democratic deficit?, institutional reforms should follow the Bank of England scenario, in which an explicit inflation target is first legislated and only then instrument (but not goal) independence granted. |
| 主题 | International Macroeconomics |
| 关键词 | Inflation targeting Central bank independence transparency Accountability Monitoring |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp5448 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/534328 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Thierry Verdier,Yves Zenou,Antoni Calvó-Armengol. DP5448 Strong and Weak Ties in Employment and Crime. 2006. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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