| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP5492 |
| DP5492 The Unequal Effects of Liberalization: Evidence from Dismantling the License Raj in India | |
| Philippe Aghion; Fabrizio Zilibotti; Stephen Redding | |
| 发表日期 | 2006-02-06 |
| 出版年 | 2006 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | The paper analyses the appointment of the European Commission as a strategic game between members of the EU's Council of Ministers and the European Parliament. The focal equilibrium results in Commissioners that duplicate policy preferences of national Council representatives. Different internal decision rules still prevent the Commission from being a Council clone in aggregate. Rather, it is predicted that Commission policies are on average more in accord with the aggregate position of the Parliament than the Council. A data set covering 66 dossiers with 162 controversial EU legislative proposals passed between 1999 and 2002 is investigated to test this. In fact, the Council is significantly more conservative than Parliament and Commission; the latter two are significantly closer to each other than Council and Commission. |
| 主题 | International Trade and Regional Economics |
| 关键词 | European commission European integration Power Collective choice |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp5492 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/534350 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Philippe Aghion,Fabrizio Zilibotti,Stephen Redding. DP5492 The Unequal Effects of Liberalization: Evidence from Dismantling the License Raj in India. 2006. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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