| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP5499 |
| DP5499 Democracy and Development: The Devil in the Details | |
| Torsten Persson; Guido Tabellini | |
| 发表日期 | 2006-02-09 |
| 出版年 | 2006 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We estimate the impact of health insurance coverage beyond National Health Insurance on the demand for several health services. Traditionally, the literature has tried to deal with the endogeneity of the private (extra) insurance decision by finding instrumental variables. Since a priori instrumental variables are hard to find we take a different approach. We focus on the most common health insurance plan in Portugal, ADSE, which is given to all civil servants and their dependants. We argue this insurance is exogenous i.e. not correlated with beneficiaries? health status. This identifying assumption allows us to estimate the impact of having ADSE coverage on three different health services using a matching estimator technique. The health services used are: number of visits, number of blood and urine tests, and the probability of visiting a dentist. Results show large positive effects of ADSE for number of visits and tests among the young (18 to 30 years old) but only the latter is statistically significantly different from zero. The effects represent 21.8 and 30% of the average number of visits and tests for the young. On the contrary, we find no evidence of moral hazard on the probability of visiting a dentist. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Demand for health services Matching estimator Moral hazard Portuguese health system |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp5499 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/534357 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Torsten Persson,Guido Tabellini. DP5499 Democracy and Development: The Devil in the Details. 2006. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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