| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP5512 |
| DP5512 International Portfolio Equilibrium and the Current Account | |
| Robert Kollmann | |
| 发表日期 | 2006-02-15 |
| 出版年 | 2006 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In many instances, 'independently-minded' top-ranking executives can impose strong discipline on their CEO, even though they are formally under his authority. This paper argues that the use of such a disciplining mechanism is a key feature of good corporate governance. We provide robust empirical evidence consistent with the fact that firms with high internal governance are more efficiently run. We empirically label as 'independent from the CEO' a top executive who joined the firm before the current CEO was appointed. In a very robust way, firms with a smaller fraction of independent executives exhibit (1) a lower level of profitability and (2) lower shareholder returns after large acquisitions. These results are unaffected when we control for traditional governance measures such as board independence or other well-studied shareholder-friendly provisions. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Corporate governance Corporate performance Acquisition Executives |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp5512 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/534370 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Robert Kollmann. DP5512 International Portfolio Equilibrium and the Current Account. 2006. |
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