| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP5491 |
| DP5491 Valuation in Over-the-Counter Markets | |
| Darrell Duffie; Lasse Heje Pedersen; Nicolae Bogdan Garleanu | |
| 发表日期 | 2006-02-20 |
| 出版年 | 2006 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We analyse an experimental public goods game in which group members can endogenously determine whether they want to supplement a standard voluntary contribution mechanism with the possibility of rewarding or punishing other group members. We find a large and positive effect of endogenous institutional choice on the level of cooperation in comparison to exogenously implemented institutions. This suggests that democratic participation rights enhance cooperation in groups. With endogenous choice, groups typically vote for the reward option, even though punishment is actually more effective in sustaining high levels of cooperation. Our results are evaluated against the predictions of social preference models. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization ; Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Public goods Punishment Reward Endogenous institutional choice Voting Experiment |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp5491 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/534372 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Darrell Duffie,Lasse Heje Pedersen,Nicolae Bogdan Garleanu. DP5491 Valuation in Over-the-Counter Markets. 2006. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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