G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP5531
DP5531 Balanced Budget Rules and Aggregate Instability: The Role of Consumption Taxes
Chryssi Giannitsarou
发表日期2006-03-02
出版年2006
语种英语
摘要The game-theoretic bargaining literature insists on non-cooperative bargaining procedure but allows 'cooperative' implementation of agreements. The effect of this is to allow free-reign of bargaining power with no check upon it. In reality, courts cannot implement agreements costlessly, and parties often prefer to use 'non-cooperative' implementation. We present a bargaining model which incorporates the idea that agreements may be enforced non-cooperatively. We show that this has a substantial impact in limiting the inequality of agreements, and results in a non-montonicity of the discount rate. The general need to maintain incentives for co-operation means it may appear that 'other-regarding' elements enter agents' utility functions. This helps us to understand why experimental subjects might begin negotiations anticipating 'fair' bargains. The model also explains why some parties may have incentives to deliberately write incomplete contracts which cannot be enforced in a court of law.
主题Industrial Organization
关键词Non-cooperative bargaining Enforcement Strength in weakness Incomplete contracts
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp5531
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/534375
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Chryssi Giannitsarou. DP5531 Balanced Budget Rules and Aggregate Instability: The Role of Consumption Taxes. 2006.
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