| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP5531 |
| DP5531 Balanced Budget Rules and Aggregate Instability: The Role of Consumption Taxes | |
| Chryssi Giannitsarou | |
| 发表日期 | 2006-03-02 |
| 出版年 | 2006 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | The game-theoretic bargaining literature insists on non-cooperative bargaining procedure but allows 'cooperative' implementation of agreements. The effect of this is to allow free-reign of bargaining power with no check upon it. In reality, courts cannot implement agreements costlessly, and parties often prefer to use 'non-cooperative' implementation. We present a bargaining model which incorporates the idea that agreements may be enforced non-cooperatively. We show that this has a substantial impact in limiting the inequality of agreements, and results in a non-montonicity of the discount rate. The general need to maintain incentives for co-operation means it may appear that 'other-regarding' elements enter agents' utility functions. This helps us to understand why experimental subjects might begin negotiations anticipating 'fair' bargains. The model also explains why some parties may have incentives to deliberately write incomplete contracts which cannot be enforced in a court of law. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Non-cooperative bargaining Enforcement Strength in weakness Incomplete contracts |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp5531 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/534375 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Chryssi Giannitsarou. DP5531 Balanced Budget Rules and Aggregate Instability: The Role of Consumption Taxes. 2006. |
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