| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP5538 |
| DP5538 On the Evolution of Market Institutions: The Platform Design Paradox | |
| Georg Kirchsteiger; Carlos Alos-Ferrer; Markus Walzl | |
| 发表日期 | 2006-03-02 |
| 出版年 | 2006 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | R&D is an inherently dynamic process which involves different intermediate steps that need to be developed before the completion of the final invention. Firms are not necessarily symmetric in their R&D abilities; some may have advantages in early stages of the R&D process while others may have advantages in other stages of the process. The paper uses a simple two-firm asymmetric ability multistage R&D race model to analyse the effect of different types of patent policy regimes and licensing arrangement on the speed of innovation, firm value and consumers' surplus. The paper demonstrates the circumstances under which a weak patent protection regime, which facilitates free imitation of any intermediate technology, may yield a higher overall surplus than a regime that awards patent for the final innovation. This result holds even in cases where the length of the patent is optimally calculated. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Patent protection R&d race Licensing |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp5538 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/534382 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Georg Kirchsteiger,Carlos Alos-Ferrer,Markus Walzl. DP5538 On the Evolution of Market Institutions: The Platform Design Paradox. 2006. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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