| 来源类型 | Discussion paper
|
| 规范类型 | 论文
|
| 来源ID | DP5554
|
| DP5554 Incentives in Competitive Search Equilibrium and Wage Rigidity |
| Espen R. Moen; Åsa Rosén
|
| 发表日期 | 2006-03-17
|
| 出版年 | 2006
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | This paper studies the design of retirement and disability policies. It illustrates the often observed exit from the labour force of healthy workers through disability insurance schemes. Two types of individuals, disabled and leisure-prone ones, have the same disutility for labour and cannot be distinguished. However, they are not counted in the same way in social welfare. Benefits depend on retirement age and on the (reported) health status. We determine first- and second-best optimal benefit levels and retirement ages and focus on the distortions which may be induced in the individuals? retirement decision. Then we introduce the possibility of testing which sorts out disabled workers from healthy but retirement-prone workers. We show that such testing can increase both social welfare and the rate of participation of elderly workers; in addition disabled workers are better taken care of. It is not optimal to test all applicants. Surprisingly, the (second-best) solution may imply later retirement for the disabled than for the leisure prone. In that case, the disabled are compensated by higher benefits. |
| 主题 | Public Economics
|
| 关键词 | Disability
Retirement
Social security
|
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp5554
|
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/534398
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Espen R. Moen,Åsa Rosén. DP5554 Incentives in Competitive Search Equilibrium and Wage Rigidity. 2006.
|
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