| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP5556 |
| DP5556 Piracy Prevention and the Pricing of Information Goods | |
| Pierre Pestieau; Helmuth Cremer | |
| 发表日期 | 2006-03-20 |
| 出版年 | 2006 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Social insurance for the elderly is judged responsible for the widely observed trend towards early retirement. In a world of laissez-faire or in a first-best setting, there would be no such trend. However, when first-best instruments are not available, because health and productivity are not observable, the optimal social insurance policy may imply a distortion on the retirement decision. The main point we make is that while there is no doubt that retirement systems induce an excessive bias towards early in many countries, a complete elimination of this bias (i.e., a switch to an actuarially fair system) is not the right answer. This is so and for two reasons. First, some distortions are second-best optimal. This is the normative argument. Second, and on the positive side, the elimination of the bias might be problematic from a political perspective. Depending on the political process, it may either not be feasible or alternatively it may tend to undermine the political support for the pension system itself. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Social security Early retirement Optimal income taxation Majority voting |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp5556 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/534407 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Pierre Pestieau,Helmuth Cremer. DP5556 Piracy Prevention and the Pricing of Information Goods. 2006. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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