| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP5558 |
| DP5558 Allocative and Informational Externalities in Auctions and Related Mechanisms | |
| Philippe Jehiel; Benny Moldovanu | |
| 发表日期 | 2006-03-22 |
| 出版年 | 2006 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study the effects of allocative and informational externalities in (multi-object) auctions and related mechanisms. Such externalities naturally arise in models that embed auctions in larger economic contexts. In particular, they appear when there is downstream interaction among bidders after the auction has closed. The endogeneity of valuations is the main driving force behind many new, specific phenomena with allocative externalities: even in complete information settings, traditional auction formats need not be efficient, and they may give rise to multiple equilibria and strategic non-participation. But, in the absence of informational externalities, welfare maximization can be achieved by Vickrey-Clarke- Groves mechanisms. Welfare-maximizing Bayes-Nash implementation is, however, impossible in multi-object settings with informational externalities, unless the allocation problem is separable across objects (e.g. there are no allocative externalities nor complementarities) or signals are one-dimensional. Moreover, implementation of any choice function via ex-post equilibrium is generically impossible with informational externalities and multidimensional types. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Auctions Externalities Interdependent values |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp5558 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/534419 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Philippe Jehiel,Benny Moldovanu. DP5558 Allocative and Informational Externalities in Auctions and Related Mechanisms. 2006. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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