| 来源类型 | Discussion paper
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| 规范类型 | 论文
|
| 来源ID | DP5572
|
| DP5572 Takeovers |
| Fausto Panunzi; Mike Burkart
|
| 发表日期 | 2006-03-22
|
| 出版年 | 2006
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | This paper studies the design of pension schemes in a society where fertility is endogenous and parents differ in their ability to raise children. In a world with perfect information, a pay-as-you-go social security system is characterized by equal pensions for all but different contributions which may or may not increase with the number of children. Additionally, fertility must be subsidized at the margin to correct for the externality that accompanies fertility. In a world of asymmetric information, incentive-related distortions supplement the Pigouvian subsidy. These may either require an additional subsidy or an offsetting tax on fertility depending on whether the redistribution is towards people with more or less children. In the former case, pensions are decreasing in the number of children: in the latter case, they are increasing. |
| 主题 | Public Economics
|
| 关键词 | Pensions
Fertility
Adverse selection
|
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp5572
|
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/534425
|
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Fausto Panunzi,Mike Burkart. DP5572 Takeovers. 2006.
|
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