| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP5583 |
| DP5583 Strategic Complementarities in Multi-Stage Games | |
| Xavier Vives | |
| 发表日期 | 2006-03-22 |
| 出版年 | 2006 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper investigates the effects of intensified screening of disability insurance benefit applications. A large-scale experiment was setup where in 2 of the 26 Dutch regions case workers of the disability insurance administration were instructed to screen applications more intense. The empirical results show that intense screening reduces long-term sickness absenteeism and disability insurance applications. This provides evidence both for direct effects of the more intensive screening on work resumption during sickness absenteeism and for self-screening by potential disability insurance applicants. We do not find any spillover effects to the inflow into unemployment insurance. A cost-benefit analysis shows that the costs of the intensified screening are only a small fraction of its benefits. |
| 主题 | Labour Economics |
| 关键词 | Sickness absenteeism Policy evaluation Disability insurance Self-screening |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp5583 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/534433 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Xavier Vives. DP5583 Strategic Complementarities in Multi-Stage Games. 2006. |
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