| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP5579 |
| DP5579 Penalty Shoot-Outs: Before or After Extra Time? | |
| Juan Carrillo | |
| 发表日期 | 2006-03-24 |
| 出版年 | 2006 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study multi-object auctions where agents have private and additive valuations for heterogeneous objects. We focus on the revenue properties of a class of dominant strategy mechanisms where a weight is assigned to each partition of objects. The weights influence the probability with which partitions are chosen in the mechanism. This class contains efficient auctions, pure bundling auctions, mixed bundling auctions, auctions with reserve prices and auctions with pre-packaged bundles. For any number of objects and bidders, both the pure bundling auction and separate, efficient auctions for the single objects are revenue-inferior to an auction that involves mixed bundling. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Auction Mixed bundling Revenue maximization |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp5579 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/534439 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Juan Carrillo. DP5579 Penalty Shoot-Outs: Before or After Extra Time?. 2006. |
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