| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP5600 |
| DP5600 Youth Unemployment and Crime in France | |
| francis kramarz; Denis Fougère; Julien Pouget | |
| 发表日期 | 2006-04-03 |
| 出版年 | 2006 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We construct a model of simultaneous change and persistence in institutions. The model consists of landowning elites and workers, and the key economic decision concerns the form of economic institutions regulating the transaction of labour (e.g., competitive markets versus labour repression). The main idea is that equilibrium economic institutions are a result of the exercise of de jure and de facto political power. A change in political institutions, for example a move from non-democracy to democracy, alters the distribution of de jure political power, but the elite can intensify their investments in de facto political power, such as lobbying or the use of paramilitary forces, to partially or fully offset their loss of de jure power. In the baseline model, equilibrium changes in political institutions have no effect on the (stochastic) equilibrium distribution of economic institutions, leading to a particular form of persistence in equilibrium institutions, which we refer to as invariance. When the model is enriched to allow for limits on the exercise of de facto power by the elite in democracy or for costs of changing economic institutions, the equilibrium takes the form of a Markov regime-switching process with state dependence. Finally, when we allow for the possibility that changing political institutions is more difficult than altering economic institutions, the model leads to a pattern of captured democracy, whereby a democratic regime may survive, but choose economic institutions favouring the elite. The main ideas featuring in the model are illustrated using historical examples from the US South, Latin America and Liberia. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Democracy De facto power De jure power Dictatorship Elites Institutions Labour repression Persistence Political economy |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp5600 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/534457 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | francis kramarz,Denis Fougère,Julien Pouget. DP5600 Youth Unemployment and Crime in France. 2006. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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