| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP5622 |
| DP5622 On the Theory of Ethnic Conflict | |
| Wilbur John Coleman II; Francesco Caselli | |
| 发表日期 | 2006-04-20 |
| 出版年 | 2006 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study equilibrium in a multistage race in which players compete in a sequence of simultaneous move component contests. Players may win a prize for winning each component contest, as well as a prize for winning the overall race. Each component contest is an all-pay auction with complete information. We characterize the unique equilibrium analytically and demonstrate that it exhibits endogenous uncertainty. Even a large lead by one player does not fully discourage the other player, and each feasible state is reached with positive probability in equilibrium (pervasiveness). Total effort may exceed the value of the prize by a factor that is proportional to the maximum number of stages. Important applications are to war, sports, and R&D contests and the results have empirical counterparts there. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | All-pay auction Contest Race Conflict Multi-stage R&d Endogenous uncertainty Preemption Discouragement |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp5622 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/534492 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Wilbur John Coleman II,Francesco Caselli. DP5622 On the Theory of Ethnic Conflict. 2006. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
