| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP5651 |
| DP5651 Institutional Weakness and Stock Price Volatility | |
| Assaf Razin; Galina Hale; Hui Tong | |
| 发表日期 | 2006-04-28 |
| 出版年 | 2006 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper analyzes whether the two tasks of building infrastructures which are socially useful and managing those assets should be bundled or not. When performances contracts can be written, both tasks should be performed altogether by the same firm when a better design of the infrastructure helps also to save on operating costs (positive externality). Otherwise (negative externality), tasks should be kept split apart and undertaken by different units. In incomplete contracting environments where the quality of the infrastructure may be hard to describe in advance, we isolate conditions under which either the traditional form of public provision of services or the more fashionable public-private partnership optimally emerges. The latter dominates when there is a positive externality but the private benefits from owning assets are small enough. Finally, we take a political economy perspective and study how incentive schemes are modified under the threat of capture of the decision-makers. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Public-private partnership Bundling/unbundling Agency costs Capture |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp5651 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/534506 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Assaf Razin,Galina Hale,Hui Tong. DP5651 Institutional Weakness and Stock Price Volatility. 2006. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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