| 来源类型 | Discussion paper
|
| 规范类型 | 论文
|
| 来源ID | DP5670
|
| DP5670 The Consumption-Tightness Puzzle |
| Morten Ravn
|
| 发表日期 | 2006-05-02
|
| 出版年 | 2006
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | There is a small, but growing, economics literature on the importance and effects of having monetary policy made by a committee, rather than by an individual. Complimenting this is an older and larger body of literature on groups in the other social sciences, particular in social psychology. This paper provides a review of some of this work, focussing on two important features of committees: the effect of their size on performance and whether or not they are more moderate than the members who make them up. The results of the literature on committee size and committee polarization suggest that the ideal monetary policy committee may not have many more than five members. It should have a well-defined objective and it should publish the votes of its members. It should be structured so that members do not act as part of a group, perhaps by having short terms in office and members from outside the central bank. External scrutiny of the decision-making process should be encouraged. |
| 主题 | Central Banking
|
| 关键词 | Committee size
Social loafing
Groupthink
|
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp5670
|
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
|
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/534514
|
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Morten Ravn. DP5670 The Consumption-Tightness Puzzle. 2006.
|
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