| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP5664 |
| DP5664 Inflation Targeting under Imperfect Knowledge | |
| Athanasios Orphanides; John C Williams | |
| 发表日期 | 2006-05-28 |
| 出版年 | 2006 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Governments frequently intervene to support domestic industries, but a surprising amount of this support goes to ailing sectors. We explain this with a lobbying model that allows for entry and sunk costs. Specifically, policy is influenced by pressure groups that incur lobbying expenses to create rents. In expanding industry, entry tends to erode such rents, but in declining industries, sunk costs rule out entry as long as the rents are not too high. This asymmetric appropriability of rents means losers lobby harder. Thus it is not that government policy picks losers, it is that losers pick government policy. |
| 主题 | International Trade and Regional Economics |
| 关键词 | Lobbying Sunset industries Sunk costs |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp5664 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/534541 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Athanasios Orphanides,John C Williams. DP5664 Inflation Targeting under Imperfect Knowledge. 2006. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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